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CLASS WARFARE: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF LOW-INCOME
LITIGANTS FROM THE CIVIL DOCKET
Myriam Gilles∗
At root, equal justice is simply the notion that law and the courts should be
fair, even if life isn’t.
—Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., California Court of Appeal
ABSTRACT
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the startling disparities in
income and wealth in contemporary U.S. society. The enormous concentration
of economic power in the top 1% is the culmination of decades of significant
income and wealth gains for the top, combined with stagnant or decreasing
growth for the majority—a trend that continues apace. The implications of this
wealth gap reverberate across the socio-legal landscape, but nowhere is the
gap more glaring than in the civil docket, where litigation—particularly class
actions brought by or on behalf of low-income consumers and employees—is
on the verge of disappearing.
To be sure, the decline in class actions is only part of the larger story, as
procedural and substantive constraints on legal access are visible
everywhere—from problems of non-representation, to cuts in funding for legal
aid and court administration, to heightened pleading standards, increasingly
restrictive views of standing to sue, and the privatization of justice. But the
thesis of this Essay is that the unavailability of class litigation is
disproportionately more harmful to low-income groups than any other legal
impairment, for a number of reasons. The first is sadly obvious: economically
disadvantaged groups are more susceptible to abusive practices in the
marketplace and the workplace, suffering disproportionate instances of
predatory lending, consumer fraud, unfair wages, and discrimination. Without
a mechanism for aggregating these low-value claims, the rights of low-income
individuals would simply slip through the legal cracks, unvindicated. But, more
brutally, recent studies show that, to a large and disturbing extent, the poor
stay poor: when members of low-income groups suffer from group-based
∗ Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law. Thank you to the organizers and participants of the
Emory/Pound conference—especially Richard Freer, Alexi Lahav, Judith Resnik, and Robert Klonoff.
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wrongdoing, they are likely to experience the same or similar wrongdoing
again in the future. The failure to detect and deter bad actors who prey on the
poor only promotes chronic exploitation and the perpetuation of intractable
poverty. And again, class litigation is often the best or only means of bringing
these claims.
This Essay ends by examining an important by-product of the
disappearance of low-income claimants from the civil docket: as contemporary
judges see fewer civil cases brought by or on behalf of poor people, one might
expect that they will grow further out of touch with and more ill-equipped to
manage these claims; and as this reservoir of wisdom empties, judicial
attitudes towards the poor may harden, growing disdainful and ungenerous.
Accordingly, when judges are sporadically faced with the legal claims of
low-income groups, it becomes harder to spot (or easier to ignore) patterns of
exploitative, abusive conduct by corporate or governmental actors.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the startling disparities in
income and wealth in contemporary U.S. society.1 The enormous concentration
of economic power in the top 1% is the culmination of decades of significant
income and wealth gains for the top, combined with stagnant or decreasing
growth for the majority—a trend that continues apace.2 The widening wealth
gap recently led Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellin to wonder aloud
whether “this trend is compatible with values rooted in our nation’s history,
among them the high value Americans have traditionally placed on equality of
opportunity.”3
1 See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20625,
2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf (showing that the share of total income earned by
the top 1% of Americans exceeded 20% as of the end of 2012); Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, America’s
Wealth Gap Between Middle-Income and Upper-Income Families Is Widest on Record, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT
TANK (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/17/wealth-gap-upper-middle-income/
(reporting that in 2013 the median wealth of the nation’s upper-income families ($639,400) was nearly seven
times the median wealth of middle-income families ($96,500)).
2 Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and
the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152, 155–58, 163–64 (2010)
(showing that the wealthiest 1% of households have seen significant and repeated income gains since 1980,
while lower and middle-income wages have remained stagnant or worse).
3 Janet L. Yellen, Chairwoman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Conference
on Economic Opportunity and Equality 2–3 (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/yellen20141017a.pdf.
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This great gap between the very rich and everyone else has grown only
more pronounced in the wake of the recent financial crisis, which ravaged the
value of assets held by low-income families4 and devastated the labor
markets,5 as companies sent thousands of lower-skilled, labor-intensive jobs
overseas.6 The resulting financial pressures pushed many already fragile
communities over the poverty threshold,7 where compounding injustices have
recently sparked violence and rioting.8
The financial crisis also generated turmoil within low-income groups
relating to, among other things, consumer credit, housing, and employment—
exacerbating existing economic disadvantages. For example, owing to the
4 See, e.g., Elyse Cherry, Opinion, Where the Housing Crisis Continues, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/where-the-housing-crisis-continues.html (observing that “[i]n
many areas, housing prices are stuck below their inflated, pre-bubble levels,” which leads “entire communities
to struggle with high foreclosure rates and a lack of economic mobility”).
5 See, e.g., CLAIRE MCKENNA & IRENE TUNG, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, OCCUPATIONAL WAGE
DECLINES SINCE THE GREAT RECESSION: LOW-WAGE OCCUPATIONS SEE LARGEST REAL WAGE DECLINES
(2015), http://www.nelp.org/publication/occupational-wage-declines-since-the-great-recession/ (showing that
workers in the lowest-earning jobs have been hardest hit by stagnant wages).
6 See, e.g., BETH MACY, FACTORY MAN: HOW ONE FURNITURE MAKER BATTLED OFFSHORING, STAYED
LOCAL—AND HELPED SAVE AN AMERICAN TOWN (2014) (chronicling widespread effects of hundreds of
thousands of furniture-making jobs sent overseas in the mid-2000’s); Binyamin Appelbaum, Perils of
Globalization When Factories Close and Towns Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/business/a-decade-later-loss-of-maytag-factory-still-resonates.html
(detailing decline of Galesburg, Ill. in the wake of closure of Maytag factory that was its largest employer).
7 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/
documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (reporting that U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the
number of Americans living below 125% of the federal poverty level increased from 49.6 million in 2005 to
53.8 million in 2008); see also JENNIFER BROOKS ET AL., CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., TREADING WATER IN THE
DEEP END: FINDINGS FROM THE 2014 ASSETS & OPPORTUNITY SCORECARD 6 (2014),
http://assetsandopportunity.org/assets/pdf/2014_Scorecard_Report.pdf (reporting that 2011 median household
net worth continued to decline nationally and in twenty states—down 29% from the pre-recession level; and
that “the inability to save, as measured by ‘liquid asset poverty,’ remained more than double the income
poverty rate in 2011 in nearly every state”).
8 The riots in Ferguson, Baltimore, and Cleveland in the wake of police shootings of unarmed black
citizens were at least partly the result of frustration and anger by these disadvantaged communities, tired of the
“devastating effects of extreme and rising inequality.” Paul Krugman, Race, Class and Neglect, N.Y. TIMES
(May 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/opinion/paul-krugman-race-class-and-neglect.html.
Although this Essay will not separate out blacks or other racial minorities from the broader category of
economically disadvantaged citizens, it is noteworthy that the financial and other pressures discussed here are
often more potent for minority groups. See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to Charleston and Beyond,
Anguish About Race Keeps Building, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/
from-ferguson-to-charleston-and-beyond-anguish-about-race-keeps-building.html (“[T]he Great Recession
wiped out twice as much black wealth as it did white,” and over the course of the twentieth century, blacks
have been “overwhelmingly excluded from the largest opportunities for wealth creation . . . from federally
subsidized homeownership . . . to the job training programs that create millions of middle-class livelihoods.”).
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received wisdom (quite wrong as it happens) that lending to the poor was a
primary cause of the recession, the credit markets available to low-income
individuals came to a near-standstill by 2011. Accordingly, these groups
became increasingly dependent upon unscrupulous and high-priced alternatives
to traditional credit sources—i.e., payday lenders, check-cashing services,
phone cards, and other predatory business practices. And escalating debt often
creates problems for low-wage workers, as many employers have come to
routinely run credit checks to eliminate applicants with credit problems from
consideration.9 These successive calamities have created a downward spiral
that has hampered the recovery of low-income populations, even as top income
brackets have fully rebounded from losses suffered during the Great
Recession.10
These disparities are projected in myriad ways across the contemporary
socioeconomic landscape: fewer low-income families own their homes11 or are
even able to rent in decent neighborhoods (i.e., places with good schools,
parks, and transportation options12); fewer have ready access to the internet,
fresh food, green space, or adequate medical care;13 fewer go to college and
9 ANGELA PADILLA & ALICIA ATKINSON, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., THE USE (AND OVERUSE) OF CREDIT
HISTORY (2014), http://cfed.org/blog/inclusiveeconomy/Credit_Use_Overuse.pdf (citing Catherine Ruetschlin
& Dedrick Asante-Muhammad, The Challenge of Credit Card Debt for the African American Middle Class,
DEMOS & NAACP, Dec. 2013).
10 Saez & Zucman, supra note 1, at 1, 3, 24–25, 32 tbl.2 (reporting that as of 2013, the top 0.1% of the
population, which owns over 22% of the country’s wealth—roughly the same share of wealth as the bottom
90%—had fully rebounded from losses suffered during the Great Recession; meanwhile, increased debt,
stagnant wages, and higher costs have kept the lower 90% from making any real post-recession gains); see
also The Richest 10% in Developed Countries Earn Nearly 10 Times the Bottom 10%, FIN. POST (May 21,
2015), http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/the-richest-10-in-developed-countries-earn-nearly-10times-bottom-10-and-thats-stunting-growth (reporting on study by the Organization for Economic Corporation
and Development, finding that between 2008 and 2013, average household disposable income at the top 10%
rose 10.6%, while in the bottom 10% it fell 3.2%”); Yellin, supra note 3 (observing that those at the very top
recovered from the recession “as the stock market rebounded” but that lower-income groups continued to
suffer as “wage growth and the healing of the labor market have been slow, and the increase in home prices
has not fully restored the housing wealth lost by the large majority of households, for which it is their primary
assets”).
11 See, e.g., Lisa Prevost, Gap Persists in Homeownership: Low-Income and Minority Households Far
Behind in Homeownership, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/realestate/lowincome-and-minority-households-far-behind-in-homeownership.html.
12 See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Middle-Class Black Families, in Low-Income Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES
(June 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/upshot/middle-class-black-families-in-low-incomeneighborhoods.html.
13 See, e.g., FCC Head Unveils Proposal to Narrow ‘Digital Divide,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 28,
2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/national/business/story/2015/may/28/fcc-head-unveils-proposalnarrow-digital-divi/306721/. The Affordable Care Act has had tremendous impact by providing health
insurance to lower middle-class and poor Americans who could not have afforded it otherwise. But even with
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graduate;14 fewer obtain stable, middle-class jobs;15 and fewer live to old age.16
But nowhere is the gap more glaring than in the civil docket, where class
actions brought by or on behalf of low-income consumers and employees are
on the verge of disappearing.
Because individual lawsuits often cost more to bring than the victim would
recover, class actions have historically enabled lawyers to “aggregate these
small claimants into an efficient procedural vehicle for common litigation.”17
For low-income groups in particular, aggregating claims has provided
significant access to justice, as individual members of these groups may be “in
a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not know enough
or because such redress is disproportionately expensive.”18 Equally important,
recent decisions upholding important aspects of the law, conservatives will continue to seek ways to upturn
these provisions. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Editorial, The Fight for Health Care Isn’t
Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/the-fight-for-healthcare-isnt-over.html (reporting that a “prominent lawsuit filed in the name of the House of Representatives is
working its way through the courts . . . . [which] seeks to block the administration’s right to reimburse insurers
that provide cost-sharing subsidies for very poor people”). And, in other areas of healthcare policy, poor
people continue to face great difficulty. See, e.g., Gail Collins, Opinion, Battle of the Abortion Decisions, N.Y.
TIMES (June 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/opinion/gail-collins-battle-of-the-abortiondecisions.html (reporting on the difficulty poor women face in accessing safe abortions, and observing that
“[p]oor pregnant women in anti-abortion states . . . . [are] often the most desperate, and these days some are
resolving the situation with at-home abortions, using pills found on the Internet”).
14 See, e.g., Susan Dynarski, For the Poor, the Graduation Gap Is Even Wider than the Enrollment Gap,
N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/upshot/for-the-poor-the-graduation-gap-iseven-wider-than-the-enrollment-gap.html; see also Brent Staples, Editorial, Shut Out of Higher Education,
N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTES (Oct. 27, 2014), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/shut-out-ofhigher-education/ (reporting that reduced government support of public colleges has impacted “low-income
and working-class Americans who are increasingly finding themselves shut out of higher education”).
15 See, e.g., GREG J. DUNCAN & RICHARD J. MURNANE, RESTORING OPPORTUNITY: THE CRISIS OF
INEQUALITY AND THE CHALLENGE FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION (2014); Patricia Cohen, Public-Sector Jobs
Vanish, Hitting Blacks Hard, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/25/
business/public-sector-jobs-vanish-and-blacks-take-blow.html; see also Krugman, supra note 8 (observing that
“[l]agging wages . . . and work instability” are persistent problems that are often “followed by sharp declines
in marriage, [and] rising births out of wedlock”).
16 See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Disparity in Life Spans of the Rich and the Poor Is Growing, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/health/disparity-in-life-spans-of-the-rich-and-the-pooris-growing.html (reporting a fourteen-year difference in life expectancy between the top 10% of wage earning
males born in 1950 and the bottom 10%); Justin Wolfers, David Leonhardt & Kevin Quealy, 1.5 Million
Missing Black Men, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/20/
upshot/missing-black-men.html; see also ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 18 (1990) (discussing environmental racism—the dumping of toxic waste near
poor and minority neighborhoods—and the resulting, long-term health effects).
17 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 3 (2015).
18 Helen Hershkoff, Poverty Law and Civil Procedure: Rethinking the First-Year Course, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1325, 1347 (2007) (quoting Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941)).
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class actions can secure relief “that is not only longer-lasting but also
broader-based,” of critical importance to communities that are constantly
confronted with nefarious business practices.19
In prior eras, the class action device has been used to achieve precisely
these ends.20 But in recent decades, access to class-wide relief for low-income
groups has declined precipitously. First, and most dramatically, in 1996,
Congress imposed restrictions on the ability of the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC)—a primary funder of civil legal aid for low-income groups—to
participate in class actions.21 In the wake of the restrictions, LSC-funded
lawyers were forced to resign from hundreds of class cases, involving
hundreds of thousands of clients.22 Second, and more recently, judicial and
legislative constraints have all but eliminated the availability of class and
representative actions brought by private attorneys seeking to represent
low-income groups to obtain damages and injunctive relief.
To be sure, the decline in class actions is only part of the larger story, as
procedural and substantive constraints on legal access now litter the doctrinal
landscape. The “justice gap” and problems of non-representation;23 cuts in
19 Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group
Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 17 (1984); see also William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in
Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1881 (2002) (“Rules enabling liberal party joinder and
representative litigation have equalizing consequences because these rules essentially allow parties to pool
resources in prosecution of a common claim.” (footnotes omitted)); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come
Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (arguing that class
actions remedy some of the disadvantages faced by poor litigants).
20 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class
Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 10 n.46 (2005) (citing Barbara
Rabinowitz, Servicing the Poor, MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, May 10, 1993, at 29 (discussing the capacity of
Boston’s Legal Services Corporation to acquire benefits for the poor through the use of class actions)); id.
(citing William J. Dean, Success Story, 5/29/93 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1993) (noting that class actions can be used to aid
the homeless)); Gordon Bonnyman, Adapting Without Accepting: The Need for a Long-Term Strategy for
“Full Service” Representation of the Poor, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 437 (1998) (asserting that “we
cannot forget why it is that the particular advocacy activities that Congress prohibited remain so indispensable
to the poor”).
21 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a),
110 Stat. 1321-50 to -55 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2012)).
22 Blank & Zacks, supra note 20, at 17–18 (noting that “[f]or every class action case that Legal Services
programs abandoned, there are countless others that they will never take, depriving thousands of potential
clients of the representation they otherwise could expect from Legal Services lawyers” (alteration in original)
(quoting David Udell, Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Government Grants for Lawyering
for the Poor, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895, 906 (1998) (then-Director of the Brennan Center for Justice))).
23 An enduring explanation for the inability of lower-income populations to effectively access the legal
system is the “justice gap”—the inability of low-income individuals to find lawyers to represent them in legal
disputes involving housing, consumer transactions, immigration, domestic violence, and employment. Some
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funding for legal aid24 and court administration;25 heightened pleading
standards and expensive discovery;26 increasingly restrictive views of standing
to sue;27 the co-opting of small claims court by businesses seeking to collect
debts; the modern penchant for the privatization of justice; among many other
developments have erected near-impossible obstacles in the path to the
courthouse for economically disadvantaged groups. But the thesis of this Essay
is that the unavailability of class litigation is disproportionately more harmful
to low-income groups—in ways both real and expressive, short- and
long-term—than any other single factor. The reasons, I submit, are threefold
and interrelated.
First, I posit that economically disadvantaged groups are more susceptible
to abusive practices in the marketplace and the workplace, suffering
disproportionate instances of predatory lending, consumer fraud, unfair wages,
and discrimination. This overexposure is likely the result of a confluence of
factors: low bargaining power, if any; bad credit history; limited choices; and
obstacles to processing information. But whatever the root causes, my
argument here is simply that low-income groups are more likely to experience
violations of statutory rights that give rise to class-wide and collective legal
claims.

studies estimate that over 80% of low-income Americans cannot access the civil court system to press their
claims or protect their interests. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 7, at 17 (reporting that less than
20% of low-income individuals get the legal assistance they need); Theresa Amato, Opinion, Put Lawyers
Where They’re Needed, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/opinion/putlawyers-where-theyre-needed.html (observing that “the United States ranks 65th for the accessibility and
affordability of its civil justice system[,] . . . . tied with Botswana, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, not far behind
Moldova and Nigeria”).
24 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal
Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 140 (2010) (finding that there were
only 6,581 legal aid attorneys—representing only one-half of one percent of all lawyers in the United States—
providing civil legal services); David Luban, Taking out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive PublicInterest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003) (reporting that there is one lawyer for every 9,000
Americans who qualify for legal aid).
25 See, e.g., RESPONSIVE LAW, ISSUES PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/office_president/responsive_law.pdf (observing that the
crisis in access is caused by the “complexity of American legal process, cuts to court budgets[,] . . . limited
legal aid funds . . . . [and] the high cost of legal services”).
26 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 193 (2014) (presenting empirical proof that Supreme Court cases on summary judgment
and on pleading had palpably negative effects on plaintiffs).
27 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV.
301 (2002) (criticizing implementation of Article III standing rules that disadvantage poor claimants).
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Second, the impact of class relief is more acutely felt by low-income
groups. Compensatory damages—in predatory lending, employment, and other
cases—can make a discernible difference in the lives of people living on the
economic margins. But of vastly greater consequence for this population is the
deterrent effect of class actions upon future wrongdoers. This is because recent
studies show that, to a large and disturbing extent, the poor stay poor.28 A
modern consequence of the “birth lottery” is that children who are born at or
below the poverty line are very likely to remain there throughout their
lifetimes.29 As such, when members of low-income groups suffer from
group-based wrongdoing, they are likely to experience the same or similar
wrongdoing again in the future. Accordingly, the failure to detect and deter bad
actors who prey on the poor only promotes chronic exploitation and the
perpetuation of intractable poverty. In sum, the decline in class actions not
only leaves economically fragile populations without a potent remedy for past
wrongdoing, it leaves them far more vulnerable to future exploitation.
Third, as low-income plaintiffs find themselves blocked from bringing
class actions, whole categories of legal claims are disappearing from the
docket—private claims sounding in abusive debt collection, predatory lending,
consumer scams, illegal foreclosures, unfair or unpaid wages, and employment
discrimination.30 These are among the types of legal issues that economically
vulnerable populations are very likely to encounter;31 these are also the types
of claims that have driven many important doctrinal and policy advances in
consumer, employment, and other areas of law over the past half-century. As
such, much law—in the form of precedents, doctrines, rules, guiding
principles, informative discussions and debates—is lost when low-income
disputants are no longer able to file claims in public courts.
Relatedly, when low-income claims disappear from the docket, it is
reasonable to worry that judges will lose important opportunities to engage
28 Raj Chetty et al., Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational
Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19844, 2014), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
hendren/files/trends_in_intergenerational_mobility_pdf.pdf?m=139091954.
29 Id.
30 This Essay will focus on private enforcement of consumer and employment statutes, rather than claims
against government actors sounding in violations of state and federal constitutional and statutory rights.
However, the latter are also in decline. For an excellent discussion of recent developments, see David Marcus,
The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777 (2016).
31 Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: Economic Analysis 18 (Chicago Inst. for Law
and Econ., Working Paper No. 628, 2013) (surmising that “weak consumers are disproportionately likely to
seek remedies in court . . . . [because] [t]he poor and the less sophisticated endure more abuse and exploitation
by dealing with lower quality vendors”).
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with these categories of issues and litigants. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, the
nation committed to a domestic War on Poverty and an end to racial
discrimination, which “focused attention on the plight of poor Americans.”32
These social movements energized and empowered judges to actively respond
to claims brought by and on behalf of the poor and politically marginalized.33
But as contemporary judges see fewer civil cases brought by or on behalf of
poor people, one might expect that they will grow further out of touch with and
ill-equipped to manage these claims; and as this reservoir of wisdom empties,
judicial attitudes towards the poor harden, growing disdainful and
ungenerous.34 Accordingly, when judges are sporadically faced with the legal
claims of low-income groups, it becomes harder to spot (or easier to ignore)
patterns of exploitative, abusive conduct by corporate or governmental actors.
As David Luban once wrote, “[L]itigants serve as nerve endings registering the
aches and pains of the body politic . . . . The law is a self-portrait of our
politics, and adjudication is at once the interpretation and the refinement of the
portrait.”35 Today, whole swaths of the population are glaringly absent from
that self-portrait, and one might predict that the judicial nerve endings grow
numb to their complaints.
This Essay will explore these three, interconnected implications of the
decline of class actions and their impact on low-income groups.
I. THE VULNERABILITIES OF LOW-INCOME GROUPS
This Essay begins with the premise that class actions and other aggregative
forms of litigation greatly benefit lower-income groups—and concomitantly,
that the curtailing of such litigation will do these groups great harm. This
premise initially follows from the common wisdom that, no matter one’s
income bracket, aggregating small-value claims overcomes “the problem that

32 Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 958–
59 (1986) (attributing this focus on the convergence of LBJ’s War on Poverty, the civil rights movement, and
the birth of the consumer movement).
33 Id. at 959 n.122 (reporting that Justice Skelly Wright, who wrote the famous unconscionability
decision Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), had observed that “a
socially conscious atmosphere helped to spur his activist school desegregation decisions”).
34 In an analogous context, Charles Lawrence has observed that judges are not immune from
experiencing and acting upon “cultural disdain,” and “may well be insensitive or even antagonistic toward the
values, needs, and experiences” of groups with which they cannot relate. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 380 (1987).
35 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2638 (1995).
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small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights.”36 When these individual claims are worth
less than the cost of litigation, “aggregation renders them marketable and
incentivizes a plaintiff’s lawyer to bring suit.”37
This practical reality of aggregation is only amplified where the victims of
wrongdoing are economically vulnerable. This is largely because
lower-income groups are more regularly and perilously exposed to abusive
practices by private business interests—abuses that often result in small-dollar
consumer injuries or group-based workplace harms.38 As one writer put it,
living in poverty “creates an abrasive interface with society; poor people are
always bumping into sharp legal things.”39 And because the harm that results
from these conflicts in both the marketplace and workplace weighs more
heavily upon low-income individuals—whose margins are thinner, with more
to lose—it follows that these groups are more likely to benefit from legal
action taken to address abusive conduct in the marketplace and workplace.40
A. Low-Income Consumers
In the marketplace for goods and services, poor and uneducated consumers
suffer the disproportionate burden of fraud and other abusive practices. Among
other things, economically disadvantaged groups are more susceptible to the
scourges of predatory lending, reverse redlining, abusive mortgages, exorbitant
student loans, subprime car loans, and other unfair and deceptive consumer

36 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); see also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional
framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”); Buford v. H&R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D.
340, 345–46 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (noting that an essential purpose of class actions is “to provide a feasible means
for asserting the rights of those who ‘would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available’”
(quoting Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985))).
37 Marcus, supra note 30, at 31.
38 See, e.g., Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for Low-Income Litigants,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (1988) (“[E]conomic actors may systematically take advantage of low-income
persons because of their inability to exercise their rights in the judicial arena. For instance, it may be profitable
for a merchant systematically to charge usurious interest for essential items purchased on credit, knowing that
this practice will never be challenged in court.”).
39 Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1970).
40 Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369,
377 (2004) (“Individuals at the economic margin are much less able to ‘lump it’ when faced with a denial of
rights or benefits.”).
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practices.41 As Professor Ben-Shahar has observed, “The poor and the less
sophisticated endure more abuse and exploitation by dealing with lower quality
vendors.”42 These experiences regularly recur because low-income groups face
significant structural barriers to accessing traditional credit markets; as such,
these groups are heavily reliant upon high-cost, lightly regulated “fringe
banking” options—such as payday loans, money orders, pawnshops,
rent-to-own stores and high-interest-rate credit cards. These alternatives often
leave low-income individuals in even greater debt, as exploitative providers
target these groups for especially abusive practices.43
Payday lending, in particular, has caught many low-income borrowers in a
“turnstile of debt”: unable to repay short-term, high-interest-rate loans within
the typical two-week loan period, low-income borrowers are forced to keep
borrowing at higher and higher rates.44 With storefronts “[s]trategically located
in low-income neighborhoods”45 and close to military bases,46 the

41 See generally JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE
POOR (1994). “Reverse redlining is the practice of extending credit on unfair terms” to “specific geographic
areas based on the income, race, or ethnicity of residents.” Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778
A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
42 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 31, at 18.
43 Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002)
(arguing that “a large number of payday lenders engage in predatory practices”); Angela Littwin, Testing the
Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit Card Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable
Lending Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 425–29 (discussing credit cards as a problematic form of
credit for low-income borrowers); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855,
901–05 (2007) (proposing that payday lending regulations increase transparency of lending services and
increase common disclosures among lenders to those using payday-lending services); Nathalie Martin, 1,000%
Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563
(2010) (proposing federal usury cap on payday-lending industry); Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams,
Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41 (2012)
(describing the need for greater regulation and arguing for more regulations to protect lower class credit
products).
44 Repeat-payday loans account for $3.5 billion in fees each year. Phantom Demand: Short-Term Due
Date Generates Need for Repeat Payday Loans, Accounting for 76% of Total Volume, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING (July 9, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/phantom-demand-short-termdue-date-generates-need-repeat-payday-loans. It is estimated that 90% of the payday-lending business is
generated by borrowers with five or more loans per year, and over 60% of business is generated by borrowers
with 12 or more loans per year. GA. WATCH, DON’T FIX WHAT AIN’T BROKE: GEORGIA’S PAYDAY LOAN BAN
WORKS (2015), http://www.georgiawatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Georgia-Watch-Payday-LendingReport.pdf. Meanwhile, loans to non-repeat borrowers account for just 2% of payday-loan volume. Predatory
Lending Practices Fact Sheet, IMPACT AM., http://impactamerica.com/predatory-lending-practices-fact-sheet/
(last visited May 18, 2016).
45 Payday
&
Other
Small
Dollar
Loans,
CTR.
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
LENDING,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday-other-small-dollar-loans (last visited May 18, 2016).
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payday-lending industry is concentrated in the poorest counties of the poorest
states—luring “unsophisticated shoppers by the hundreds of thousands into a
thicket of debt from which many never emerge.”47 And while there have been
some efforts to regulate the industry via legislation48 and enforcement
actions,49 private litigation on behalf of borrowers has been critical in detecting
and reforming abusive industry practices.50
For example, in 2002, federal bank regulators investigated California-based
Goleta Bank and its payday-lending arm, ACE Cash Express, for “unsound”
lending practices; the bank eventually settled with regulators for $325,000 in
fines and penalties.51 But a year later, a nationwide class action brought by
borrowers against Goleta and ACE detailed widespread exploitation of
economically vulnerable, low-income consumers in the collection of high
interest loans, “flipping” practices, and deceptive marketing.52 The class was
certified and ultimately settled for $54.5 million in cash and debt forgiveness
for class members.53 Equally important, Goleta agreed as part of the settlement
to halt its payday-lending program.54
46 Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and
Geography of “Payday Loans” in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005) (finding high concentrations of
payday lending businesses in counties, ZIP codes, and neighborhoods in close proximity to military bases).
47 Brian Grow & Keith Epstein, The Poverty Business, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2007, 11:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-05-20/the-poverty-business.
48 Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted double-digit rate caps on payday loans.
See Small Dollar Loans: Our Policy Positions, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsible
lending.org/issues/payday-other-small-dollar-loans/small-dollar-loans-policy (last visited May 18, 2016).
49 See, e.g., FTC v. AMG Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00536-GMN-VCG, 2015 WL 4073192, at *1 (D.
Nev. July 2, 2015). AMG Services, Inc. involved an action brought by the FTC alleging that payday lending
company’s loans violate § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 § U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (2012), the
Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012), and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026(a) (2015)).
The CFPB has also monitored payday lenders. AMG Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 4073192, at *1; see, e.g., Barbara
Mishkin, CFPB Files Lawsuit Against Internet Payday Loan Companies, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
MONITOR (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/08/05/cfpb-files-lawsuit-against-internetpayday-loan-companies/.
50 See, e.g., Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs., 12 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1308 (D. Nev. 2014) (certifying
class action brought by consumers against payday lenders alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act); Mitchem v. GFG Loan Co., No. 99-C-1866, 2000 WL 294119, at *3, *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17,
2000) (in consolidated claims by borrowers, court found that the Truth in Lending Act’s provisions required
disclosure in that case and accordingly partially denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss).
51 Payday Loan Program Halted, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/30/
business/fi-goleta30.
52 Purdie v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV1754L, 2003 WL 22976611, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
11, 2003).
53 Id. at *2.
54 Fed. Judge OKs Settlement of National ‘Payday Loan’ Class Action, 9 ANDREWS’ BANK & LENDER
LIABILITY LITIG. REP. 8 (2004).
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Studies confirm that lower-income groups are specifically targeted by a
host of shady businesses for various other types of economic exploitation,55
presumably because perpetrators perceive these groups as financially
unsophisticated and therefore less likely to seek legal or other assistance to
combat abusive tactics.56 And the unremitting exposure to abusive practices
only worsens existing economic vulnerabilities, rendering low-income groups
further weakened and with fewer choices or alternatives. As Michael Barr
found in a study of low-income households in Detroit, unscrupulous businesses
can impose “high transaction costs on lower-income households, increase their
costs of credit, and reduce their opportunities to save.”57 Similarly, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has recently begun to regulate
unfair and deceptive practices in the nonbank auto-loan market.58 The CFPB
has found that predatory car lenders have systematically targeted minority and
low-income consumers,59 exposing these groups to “higher odds of default and
repossession . . . which can endanger the ability of those borrowers to get and
hold jobs.”60 As the result of this over-exposure to unfair and deceptive
practices, low-income groups are more likely to have credit-card
delinquencies, unpaid medical bills, overdraft fees leading to closed bank
accounts, and repeated bankruptcies.
In response, federal and state legislators have sought to empower
low-income consumers by enacting consumer-protection legislation that
expressly contemplates class action litigation as a means of enforcement and
redress. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA),61 Fair Credit Reporting Act,62 and

55 Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the Duty to Decide, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1501, 1509 nn.43–44 (2008) (listing and describing lending studies).
56 See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 356 (2006) (“Predatory lenders market their products to people who have
little or no experience with mortgage loans and who do not have sufficient skills to untangle the maze of
contract terms and engage in meaningful assessments of their options.” (footnotes omitted)).
57 MICHAEL S. BARR, NO SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 8 (2012).
58 CFPB to Oversee Nonbank Auto Finance Companies, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 10, 2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-to-oversee-nonbank-auto-finance-companies/.
59 Putting an End to Abusive Car Loans, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/14/opinion/sunday/putting-an-end-to-abusive-car-loans.html (reporting on enforcement actions
resulting in fines totaling $18 million and in payments totaling $136 million to 425,000 black, Hispanic and
Asian borrowers who were charged higher auto-loan interest rates than comparable white borrowers).
60 Id.
61 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012). TILA regulates the disclosure of credit terms and discrimination in
determining credit limits, and it specifically provides that plaintiffs may recover “in the case of a class action,
such amount as the court may allow.” Id. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
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various other federal consumer-protection laws63 specifically envision that
collective litigation efforts will comprise a central mechanism of statutory
enforcement. Similarly, nearly every state has laws on its books to protect
small-claims consumers,64 and many of these statutes expressly anticipate
consumer class actions as a principal means of enforcement.65 Explicit in these
statutory grants of authority is the concept of the “private attorney general”—
i.e., enabling economically disadvantaged groups harmed by private conduct to
spread litigation costs across a large number of plaintiffs, significantly
reducing the cost per litigant and allowing lower-income plaintiffs to share in
any compensatory recovery, as well as authorizing injunctive relief to reform
abusive practices.66
B. Low-Wage Workers
Similarly, the working poor, as a group, are disproportionately more likely
to experience abusive employment practices than their better-off
counterparts.67 As with low-income consumers, researchers surmise that
employers engage in misconduct against low-wage and unskilled workers
because they have less bargaining power and are less likely to sue.68 Studies of
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a–1681x; see White v. E-Loan, Inc., No. C 05-02080 SI, 2006 WL 2411420, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2006) (“[W]ithout class actions, there is unlikely to be any meaningful enforcement of the
FCRA by consumers whose rights have been violated.”).
63 See, e.g., Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601); Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667f; Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f; Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.
64 See William L. Stern, The Reliance Element in State Consumer-Fraud Class Actions, 23 REV.
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. 1, 2 (2007).
65 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4 (West 2015) (authorizing class actions in deceptive sales act);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211 (2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 342-b, 349 (McKinney 2012); WIS. STAT.
§ 100.20 (2013–14), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2013/statutes/statutes/100.pdf.
66 Ben-Shahar, supra note 31, at 19, 21 (observing that class actions may “enable the poor to piggyback
on the litigation effort of others, and collect the recovery that every member of the class is entitled to without
any deliberate effort,” but also warning of “disproportionately low participation rate[s]” by the poor, who often
“do not read the boilerplate notices about the settlements”).
67 In 2012, U.S. households earning less than $30,000 constituted approximately 33% of the population.
AARON E. COBET, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLD SPENDING AND THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 7 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2014/high-income-spending-economicrecovery/pdf/high-income-spending-economic-recovery.pdf; see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2014, at 287 tbl.N (2014), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2014_empl_outlook-2014-en#page289
(finding
that 25.3% of U.S. workers qualify as “low wage earners”).
68 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kristen, Blanca Banuelos & Daniela Urban, Workplace Violence and Harassment
of Low-Wage Workers, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169, 170 (2015) (observing that most workers “remain
silent and never pursue justice against transgressor employers”); see also David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why
Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB.
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workplace design have shown, for example, that employers utilize “fewer
preventative tools to combat sexual harassment among low-income workers,”
safely assuming these workers are too fearful of losing their jobs or too
intimidated by the legal system to actually file a lawsuit alleging violations of
Title VII.69
Economists provide other explanations for why low-wage workers may
suffer disproportionate harm in the workplace, including a lack of information
about alternative employment and rational risk-aversion—i.e., the desperate
need for low-income workers to retain their jobs, no matter the mistreatment,
because they lack any financial cushion whatsoever.70
Whatever the underlying reasons for the overexposure to workplace abuse,
the powerful impact of these abuses on economically vulnerable groups is
clear. Studies show, for example, that lower-income groups earn less money
for similar work as their better-off counterparts, receive fewer benefits,
experience less job security, and suffer greater discrimination in the
workplace.71 “Wage theft” is especially pervasive, as practices such as
“[o]ff-the-clock work, meal and overtime violations, and time-shaving” by
unscrupulous employers unfairly shortchange low-wage workers.72 One study
found that over two-thirds of low-wage workers had “experienced at least one
pay-related violation in the previous work week,”73 and “[c]laims by workers
L. & POL’Y J. 59, 83–84 (2005) (compiling studies indicating that workers do not report employer misconduct
out of fear of retaliation).
69 Philip L. Bartlett II, Disparate Treatment: How Income Can Affect the Level of Employer Compliance
with Employment Statutes, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 419, 420–21, 449–50 (2002).
70 See Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Minimum Wage Legislation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 561, 561–71 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
71 See, e.g., Pay Equity and Discrimination, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (2010),
http://www.iwpr.org/initiatives/pay-equity-and-discrimination; see also Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave
Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 54–55 (2007).
72 Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates that Bar Class Actions
Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1104. The author also notes that “[u]npaid
minimum wages, misclassification of workers as ‘salaried’ and therefore ineligible for overtime . . . illegal
deductions, failure to pay final paychecks” are also among the “unlawful practices result[ing] in millions of
dollars of lost money for workers who can least afford it.” Id. at 1106–07.
73 ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 5 (2009), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/
03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf; see also ANNETTE BERNHARDT, SIOBHÁN MCGRATH & JAMES DIFILIPPIS,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, UNREGULATED WORK IN THE GLOBAL CITY: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 10, 12 (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/
download_file_49436.pdf (documenting violations in many New York City industries that employ workers
directly, including discount stores, restaurants, dry cleaners, and construction); Benjamin I. Sachs,
Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2744 (2008) (noting that 60% of nursing homes
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that their employers fail to pay them correctly have quadrupled over the last
decade.”74 A recent economic study estimated that wage theft accounts for $50
billion a year in lost income—“a transfer from low-income employees to
business owners that worsens income inequality.”75
Low-wage workers have traditionally looked to collective litigation to
protect themselves from these sorts of abuses for a number of reasons. First,
the claims of low-wage workers generally involve relatively small per-person
damage which, unless they are aggregated, “fail to capture the attention of a
plaintiff’s attorney” or the defendant;76 and certainly low-income workers
“simply cannot afford the time and expense it would take to prosecute” these
small-value claims individually.77 Professor Ben-Shahar, for example,
observes that “there are almost no cases of successful [individual] litigation
commenced by lower-paid wage workers”78—a view confirmed by numerous

and 100% of poultry processing plants were out of compliance); David Weil, Public Enforcement/Private
Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 238,
244–46 (2005) (noting that fewer than half the garment contractors in Los Angeles paid the minimum wage
and more than a quarter of their workers had “experienced some degree of underpayment”).
74 Ruan, supra note 72, at 1107; see also Liz Robbins, New Weapon in Day Laborers’ Fight Against
Wage Theft: A Smartphone App, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/nyregion/
new-weapon-in-day-laborers-fight-against-wage-theft-a-smartphone-app.html (reporting that an immigrant
rights group has developed an app that will enable workers to “rate employers (think Yelp or Uber), log their
hours and wages, take pictures of job sites, and help identify . . . employers with a history of withholding
wages”).
75 DEEPAK GUPTA & LINA KHAN, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, ARBITRATION AS
WEALTH TRANSFER 9 (2016), https://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/arbitration-as-wealth-transfer
(quoting Brady Meixell & Ross Eisenbrey, An Epidemic of Wage Theft Is Costing Workers Hundreds of
Millions of Dollars a Year, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/
epidemic-wage-theft-costing-workers-hundreds/.
76 Ruan, supra note 72, at 1118–19, 1118 n.91 (“[I]ndividual wage and hour claims might be too small in
dollar terms to support a litigation effort.” (quoting Chase v. AIMCO Props., L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198
(D.D.C. 2005))); see also Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Conn. 2002) (“conclud[ing] that
a class action is the superior method” for bringing plaintiffs’ overtime claims, in part, because “the cost of
individual litigation is prohibitive”); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85–86
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that individual suits, as an alternative to class litigation, may not be feasible based on
class members’ lack of financial resources and disincentives for attorneys); Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 96 P.3d 194, 209 (Cal. 2004) (observing, in an overtime action, that “the class suit . . .
provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to
warrant individual litigation” (quoting Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 27 (Cal. 1981))).
77 Ruan, supra note 72, at 1119; see also Blank & Zacks, supra note 20, at 13 (describing the facts of
Robinson v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 771 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D. Fla. 1991), in which a low-wage worker
brought suit on behalf of hundreds of similarly situated African American employees to force the defendantemployer “to pay for the social and economic harms it [had] caused”).
78 Ben-Shahar, supra note 31, at 18.
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scholars.79 Second, class actions afford anonymity to individual workers who
might fear retaliation should they pursue a claim individually. Obscuring
individual worker identities is the only way to empower low-wage workers to
exercise their rights without fear of reprisal80 or raising questions of individual
credibility.81
Finally, federal and state agency enforcement measures have generally
proven inadequate to the task of protecting workers from wage theft and other
abusive practices due to a lack of resources and shifting partisan preferences.82
When “[l]aws against wage theft are massively under enforced,” workers are
left with only class action litigation as a means of securing redress.83
According to a recent study, between 1997 and 2012, private plaintiffs filed
forty-eight times more employment cases than the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and thirty-eight times more Fair Labor
Standards Act cases than the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour
Division.84 And the bulk of these cases were class and collective actions.85 In
79

See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS (1994),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.authche
ckdam.pdf (finding that 78% of low-income households did not seek legal help for employment-related
problems); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An
Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 45 (explaining that the absence of such
cases is due to “the fact that lower-paid employees seem to lack ready access to court”).
80 See, e.g., Ruan, supra note 72, at 1106 (“Collective actions . . . have the advantage of protecting
vulnerable workers from drawing attention to their individual participation and subjecting them to retaliatory
measures.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1349 & n.243 (observing that
employee fears of retaliation “may be well founded,” given the high incidence of retaliation claims filed before
the EEOC).
81 Bartlett, supra note 69, at 438 (observing that “lower-income employees [may] have a harder time
finding witnesses because their fellow employees fear losing their jobs,” whereas “[h]igher-income employees,
who likely have greater skills and greater job opportunities, may not be as deterred by the risk of losing their
jobs” because they “tend to be more mobile, and thus more able to find work”).
82 See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (“Private lawsuits can potentially help to fill the enforcement gap left by the
undercommitment of public resources; indeed, they can sometimes supply a big gun where public enforcement
has none to wield.”); see also Ruan, supra note 72, at 1112–14 (citing statistics reflecting a decline in the
number of workers served by the Department of Labor and state regulatory agencies).
83 GUPTA & KHAN, supra note 75, at 9.
84 Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical
Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1070 n.2 (2014). Further, the author’s note that almost all the lawsuits brought by
the EEOC and the U.S. Department of Labor began as worker-filed charges rather than agency-initiated
investigations. Id. at 1070 n.3.
85 The FLSA provides that either aggrieved workers or the Secretary of Labor may sue in federal court to
hold employers liable for violations, and provides for double damages and fee shifting. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2012). It also allows workers to aggregate their claims into “collective actions,” though it requires them to
opt-in to representation rather than following the typical opt-out procedure for federal class actions. Id.
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all, collective litigation has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars repaid to
injured workers and countless reforms implemented in American workplaces.86
***
One final real-world point: observers often point out that litigation is only
one of many ways to address the problems facing low-income groups. And, to
be sure, administrative advocacy, legislative and lobbying efforts,
coalition-building, publicity, grass-roots community organizing and education,
public and non-profit enforcement actions, and a host of other strategies have
undeniably sought to improve conditions in various and important ways.87 But
for the most part, low-income consumers and workers generally lack the
political power with which to reliably resolve or reform widespread abuses
through these other avenues, and so they must rely on the courts.88
The poor vote in lower numbers than the well-to-do and “often suffer from
policies that reduce their political influence, such as onerous voter registration
requirements, demands for government identification at the polls, and long
waiting times to vote on Election Day.”89 Further, low-income populations and
their advocates have limited ability to petition legislatures for help because
86 See, e.g., In re Staples Inc. Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., No. 08-5746 (KSH), 2011 WL
5413221 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011) (approving $42 million settlement between misclassified assistant store
managers and employer); Ruan, supra note 72, at 1109 n.28 (citing Chao v. Atlantic Auto Care Ctr., Inc., No.
1:05-cv-06786-BSJ (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009), as “settling $3.6 million between workers and car wash
employer after employer failed to pay wages and overtime”); see also Steven Greenhouse &
Stephanie Rosenbloom, Wal-Mart Settles 63 Lawsuits Over Wages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/24/business/24walmart.html (reporting that Wal-Mart agreed to pay between
$352 and $640 million to settle sixty-three cases pending in state and federal courts in forty-two states alleging
the company forced employees to work unpaid off the clock, erased hours from time cards and prevented
workers from taking lunch and other breaks); GUPTA & KHAN, supra note 75, at 10 (reporting that New Jersey
truck drivers filed suit alleging wage theft and “recovered $2 million in back wages, New York car wash
workers $3.5 million, and cheerleaders for the Oakland raiders $1.25 million”).
87 See Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 481 (1999).
88 See generally Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (1987) (discussing “the poor’s continuing political powerlessness”); Regina
Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the
Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 70 (1991) (“[C]ommunities comprised of low-income
and working class people with no more than a high school education are not as effective at marshaling
[political] opposition as communities of middle or upper income people.”); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of
Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 600 (1994) (“Winning the battle in the
courts rather than in the legislatures does not violate democratic principles because the courts are intervening
on behalf of groups that are under-represented in the legislatures.”).
89 Bruce Bartlett, Wealth Inequality and Political Inequality, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Apr. 30, 2013,
6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/wealth-inequality-and-political-inequality/.
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they often “cannot afford to hire lobbyists to represent their views”90 and lack
“the organization, financial resources or personnel to mount and sustain
effective long-term” campaigns for legislative change.91 So while judicial
decision-making is certainly not the only method by which law is made or
clarified, as both legislatures and agencies play an important role in developing
doctrine,92 it may be so for low-income groups with less influence on those
branches of government.
Neither do low-income groups have alternative avenues for vindicating
their rights. For example, small claims courts—which flourished in the first
half of the twentieth century with the promise of “speedy and inexpensive
justice for the poor litigant”93—are today primarily used by business interests
as fora for the collection of debts.94 Nor can low-income groups reliably count
on state attorneys general or federal agencies to effectively investigate, litigate,
and remedy the universe of harms they face, as these public enforcers often
lack the resources or political will to enforce the “law of the poor” consumer or
employee.95
90 Teri J. Dobbins, The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Barriers to Justice in the Law of Contracts, 7 J.L.
SOC’Y 116, 118–19 (2005).
91 Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151,
155–56 (1996) (observing that in “battle[s] of political power, the poor usually lose out”); see also Laurence E.
Norton, II, Not Too Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REV. 601, 601 (1997) (“The poor have almost no
role in the process of enacting laws that they must live by and that will govern any court case involving them.
They have no money to contribute to the campaigns of elected officials. They vote in disproportionately small
numbers . . . . and nearly all of the lawyers available to them through legal services are prohibited from
advocating for them in the legislative process.”).
92 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 208 (2006) (“Is
publicly made law superior to privately made law? To what extent can legislatures and regulatory agencies
satisfactorily fill in for ‘lost’ judicial decisions?”); Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good?
“Overcrowded Courts” and the Private Sector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
899, 911 (2013) (“[P]recedents created by adjudication are not the only way to clarify law; legislatures and
regulatory agencies can clarify law by amending statutes and regulations to resolve previously open issues.”).
93 John Montague Steadman & Richard S. Rosenstein, “Small Claims” Consumer Plaintiffs in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court: An Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (1973).
94 See, e.g., Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Poor: Is It an Alternative?, 70 N.D. L.
REV. 269, 272 (1994) (observing that “small claims courts merely provide an inexpensive collection method
for businesses” rather than an accessible dispute resolution forum for the poor).
95 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 626 (2012) (observing that federal, state and local
enforcement agencies generally lack the resources to “redress frauds and other harms perpetuated on the
general public”); see also Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663,
664 (2008) (“Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many consumer laws provide a
private right of action so individual consumers also can litigate violations of these laws. Many of these laws
also provide class actions and statutory damages which encourage consumers to act as ‘private attorneys
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In sum, low-income groups face a paucity of political power and a dearth of
alternative enforcement options—leaving them with little choice but to rely on
private enforcement through aggregate litigation to resolve many forms of
systemic harm.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS RELIEF
Part I demonstrates that low-income groups are more likely to experience
violations of statutory rights that give rise to class-wide and collective legal
claims. In this Part, I posit that the impact of class relief, when achieved, is
more acutely beneficial to low-income groups; and concomitantly, that recent
judicial and legislative decisions restricting collective litigation visit great
harm upon these groups.
A. Directing the Deterrent Function of Class Actions at Low-Income Groups
Without diminishing the potential significance of compensatory damages
secured through class actions brought by or on behalf of low-income
individuals—damages that may prove crucial in certain scenarios96—this
subpart posits that the deterrent function of class actions is of far greater
benefit to this cohort.97 In general, deterrence is the best and highest use of
small-value class actions, which otherwise are quite poor vehicles for
efficiently distributing tiny per-person damages.98 But in the context of
low-income groups, the deterrence function of class litigation takes on
heightened significance.

general.’”); David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public–Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of
“Substitute” Attorneys General, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 423, 427 (chronicling the problem of “shrinking state
budgets and the growing list of potential big-ticket claims involving alleged harms to consumers or the
environment” that face public enforcers).
96 See, e.g., Ruan, supra note 72, at 1118–19 (observing that, for low-wage workers, even small-dollar
damages for lost wages “are crucial to the workers themselves”).
97 Indeed, some scholars have affirmatively rejected the idea that low-income groups receive much
compensatory benefit from class actions given the complexity of claims-distribution procedures. See, e.g.,
Ben-Shahar, supra note 31, at 22–23 (warning of “disproportionately low participation rates by the poor” in
claims recovery programs commonly established to distribute class settlement funds); Gail Hillebrand &
Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits,
28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 749–51, 757 (1988) (arguing that lower-income class members are less likely
to reap the benefits of class action remedies because claims procedures favor more affluent claimants).
98 Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006) (“All that matters is whether the
practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions.”).
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This claim stems from recent research showing that, to a dreadful extent,
the poor tend to stay poor. Economic mobility can be examined along two
dimensions: (1) short-term mobility, which examines how an individual or a
family’s income changes year to year; and (2) intergenerational mobility, or
“the degree to which the economic success of children is independent of the
economic status of their parents.”99 Examinations of both facets reveal severe
declines in contemporary American society as economists postulate that
growing income inequality “may be choking off opportunity.”100 On short-term
mobility, one well-respected study concluded that 70% of low-income
individuals remained stuck at or below the poverty line as adults.101 Other
studies have reached similar results.102 And, even more disturbing, recent
research reveals that children born to poor parents are themselves likely to
remain poor throughout their lives.103 Not surprisingly, on the other end of the
wealth spectrum, American elites are passing their economic and educational
advantages on to their children.104
This high “intergenerational elasticity of earnings” means that there is
considerable “stickiness” at the lower end of the income distribution, “such
that the chances of moving from one extreme to the other in a generation are
very low.”105 This current research stands in stark contrast to earlier views of

99 TOM HERTZ, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY IN AMERICA i (2006),
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/kf/hertz_mobility_analysis.pdf.
100 Timothy Noah, The Mobility Myth, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 8, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/
100516/inequality-mobility-economy-america-recession-divergence. The relationship between inequality and
earnings mobility is termed “The Great Gatsby Curve,” and is heavily debated in economic circles. Id.
Compare Cecilia García-Peñalosa & Stephen J. Turnovsky, Income Inequality, Mobility, and the Accumulation
of Capital, 19 MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS 1332 (2015) (finding a relationship between inequality and
mobility), with Deirdre Bloome, Income Inequality and Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United
States, 93 SOC. FORCES 1047 (2015) (finding no statistical relationship between inequality and mobility).
101 Moving on Up: Why Do Some Americans Leave the Bottom of the Economic Ladder, but Not
Others?, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/11/01/
movingonuppdf.pdf.
102 See HERTZ, supra note 99.
103 Id. at i (reporting that children from low-income families have only a 1% chance of reaching the top
5% of the income distribution); Chetty et al., supra note 28. But see Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The
Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level
Estimates (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard University), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/
files/nbhds_paper.pdf?m=1430722623 (showing that poor children who grow up in some cities have sharply
better odds of escaping poverty than similar poor children elsewhere).
104 America’s Elite: An Hereditary Meritocracy, ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.economist.com/
node/21640316/print.
105 HERTZ, supra note 99, at 2, 4 (emphasis omitted) (observing that differences in education, race and
health have high salience in predicting intergenerational mobility).
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poverty as a transient “point on a continuum, rather than a sharp, clearly
demarcated category of social experience.”106
Setting aside the serious implications of this research for belief in the
“American Dream,”107 the practical reality is that, when members of
low-income groups suffer group-based harm, there is a high likelihood that
precisely the same individuals will suffer precisely the same harm in the future
given the inability to escape poverty. And further, it is likely that their children
(and possibly grandchildren) will also suffer the same harms in the more
distant future.108
Accordingly, the failure to detect and deter bad actors who prey on the poor
promotes ongoing, impending, and consistent exploitation. The availability of
class and collective litigation counteracts this concern by first generating
sufficiently massive and certain economic liabilities against those who
regularly exploit low-income groups so as to deter future wrongdoing. In other
words, when “the violator is confronted with the costs of his violation,” others
in his cohort are put on notice and can therefore determine whether to reform
their practices to avoid such costs.109
Class actions caution potential violators that certain conduct is prohibited
and announce to potential victims the merits of their claims. Finally, class-wide
remedies may include broad-based injunctive relief to reform problematic
practices—which then allows a presiding court “to ensure that low-income

106 MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA
277 (1986) (describing a study conducted in Michigan in the 1980s which showed that poverty “lasted
relatively briefly, and children whose parents relied on welfare were no more likely to need public assistance
as adults than were others in the sample”).
107 See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122 (2009) (“[T]he American Dream is that,
through hard work, a person can rise from even a seriously disadvantaged background.”). Some research has
posited that the prospect of upward mobility may explain why low-income groups are not especially strong
advocates of redistributive policies because of the belief that they, or in the least their children, are likely to
climb the income ladder. Roland Bénabou & Efe A. Ok, Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution:
The Poum Hypothesis, 116 Q.J. ECON. 447, 447 (2001).
108 Edgar S. Cahn, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2133, 2135 (1994) (“Poverty is also
powerlessness: being trapped, relegated to a status from which one cannot escape, impotent to change
circumstances that affect one’s fate and unable to alter the conduct of others that impacts adversely on oneself,
one’s family, one’s neighborhood. Poverty is ultimately economic, social, and civic disenfranchisement.”).
109 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 349–50 (1972); see also Gilles & Friedman, supra
note 98.
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persons learn of court-ordered remedies that may be available to them.”110
Individual litigation rarely can achieve similar outcomes—indeed, the results
of individual suits are often settled in secret, known only to the parties
themselves.111
So while some legal scholars have debated the deterrence value of class
action litigation in other settings, there seems little doubt that such litigation
may serve as a significant constraint against the cycle of exploitation that
perpetuates in poverty.112
B. The Decline in Class Actions and Collective Litigation
Recent decades have witnessed a gradual dismantling of aggregative
proceedings and, indeed, access to courts in non-aggregative settings as
well113—much of which has been meticulously chronicled and dissected by
legal scholars.114 The fairly obvious point here is that the impact of these
developments on low-income groups is especially severe as it leaves them
markedly vulnerable to abuse.
In particular, recent decisions enforcing class action bans in standard-form
contracts may mark the end of many class actions based on contractual
relationships.115 Without question, the rights of all would-be litigants are
110 Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the Courts? Some
Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 882 (2002).
111 See generally Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunction and No-Modification Terms: Challenging
“Anti-Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469 (2015).
112 But see Bartlett, supra note 69, at 435 (observing that “if low-income employees are primarily
concerned with having a job and feeding their families, and only worry about the job environment as a
secondary concern” then “[t]his could affect the employee’s estimation of the value of injunctive relief,
leading higher-income employees to view injunctive relief as providing a greater benefit, perhaps, than
lower-income employees”); Ben-Shahar, supra note 31, at 40 (noting that “it is it is questionable whether
businesses that specialize in deliberate advantage taking of ignorant and poor borrowers . . . would be
effectively deterred by the threat” of class litigation and that “[t]he worst wrongdoers may not be the ones with
the deepest pockets that attract private actions”).
113 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 26, at 193 (concluding that the Supreme Court’s
imposition of heightened pleading requirements in Twombly and Iqbal “had palpably negative effects on
plaintiffs”); see also Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501 (2012); A.
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010).
114 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 893 (2016); Coffee, supra note 17; Gilles & Friedman, supra note 95, at 631; Robert H. Klonoff, The
Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013); Marcus, supra note 30.
115 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (rejecting the argument that a
class action ban stripped plaintiffs of their rights under the antitrust laws because it forced each plaintiff to
shoulder non-recoupable expert and other costs that vastly exceeded any amount the individual plaintiff could
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greatly affected by class action bans. For example, the CFPB Arbitration Study
found that nearly all arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts
contained class action bans.116 These bans mandate that all consumers, no
matter their economic status, resolve disputes through individual arbitration
rather than aggregate litigation.117 But given the certainty that low-income
consumers and employees will almost never arbitrate small-dollar claims
individually,118 or attract counsel on a contingent fee basis,119 such provisions
effectively eliminate these groups’ access to justice. More generally, judicial
sanction of class action bans surely operates most harshly upon the poor, who
(1) are more likely to be parties to standard-form contracts in which they lack
any real power to understand, challenge, or negotiate terms120 or make
well-informed choices amongst alternatives;121 and (2) are less likely to fully
hope to win); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748, 1753 (2011) (striking down state
law rule under which arbitration clauses were regarded as unconscionable unless they allowed for class
proceedings, and dismissing the argument “that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar
claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system”).
116 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD–
FRANK WALL STREET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), at 44 (2015) [hereinafter ARBITRATION
STUDY], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.
117 Id. at 44–46.
118 See, e.g., id. § 1.4.3, at 11–12 (concluding that from 2010 to 2012, consumers filed an average of 411
arbitrations in the consumer finance space, but that only 25 consumer arbitrations per year involved claims of
less than $1,000). But see Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2913 (2015) (observing that some states,
such as California, have “required fee waivers for ‘indigent consumers,’ defined as those with incomes of less
than ‘300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines’” (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1) (West
2015))).
119 See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006) (“[C]lass-action
waivers can functionally exculpate wrongful conduct by reducing the possibility of attracting competent
counsel to advance the cause of action. Class-action waivers prevent an aggregate recovery that can serve as a
source of contingency fees for potential attorneys.”); Lauren Weber, More Companies Block Staff from Filing
Suits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015, 1:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-block-staff-fromsuing-1427824287 (observing that where class actions are unavailable “workers frequently abandon claims
because individual damages are too small to interest attorneys”).
120 See generally Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 233, 239 (2002) (observing that poor, less-educated citizens are less likely to read and understand the
terms of standard-form contracts because the “literacy required to comprehend the average disclosure form and
key contract terms simply is not within the reach of the majority of American adults”).
121 Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs, The Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power in Contract Law,
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1025–26 (2014) (observing that “when the market does not provide the
consumer an opportunity to obtain the good or service without agreeing to a particularly onerous contractual
term,” courts “have held that the lack of alternatives makes individuals so weak that they ‘may not be deemed
to have freely chosen to enter into the contract’ and refuse to enforce the deal” (quoting Barnes v. N.H.
Karting Ass’n, 509 A.2d 151, 154 (N.H. 1986)); id. at 1029 n.63 (citing Anderson v. Ashby, 873 So. 2d 168,
176 (Ala. 2003) (invalidating an arbitration provision partly because of an income/power disparity between the
parties)).

GILLES GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

6/13/2016 1:12 PM

CLASS WARFARE

1555

appreciate the implications of such agreements—in particular, the elimination
of their rights to collectively resolve legal claims in any forum and the
long-term consequences of claims suppression.122 So, while studies show that
consumers in all income brackets are generally unaware of class action bans in
the contracts they sign,123 as Jaime Dodge has observed, “[T]he weakest and
most disempowered individuals . . . are the most willing to accept inferior
terms.”124
Similar concerns prevail in the employment context125—particularly in
wage-and-hour claims under the FLSA126—as most low-wage employees
cannot negotiate employment terms or afford to lose a job opportunity by
refusing to sign an arbitration clause. Further, as Deepak Gupta and Lina Khan
have recently shown, consolidation within many industries “has handed a
relatively small number of companies outsized influence over the contractual
terms that govern most transactions.”127 As a result, class action bans have now

122 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Did each
party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to
understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized
by deceptive sales practices?”); see also Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:
Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 48 (2000) (“The vast majority
of successful unconscionability claims involve poor, often unsophisticated, consumers challenging oppressive
adhesion contracts foisted on them by retail merchants or credit sellers.”).
123 See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 118, at 3–4, 19–24 (reporting that half of all respondents said
they didn’t know whether they had the right to sue their credit-card issuer in court, and more than a third of
those who were bound by forced-arbitration clauses still believed, incorrectly, that they could take the
company to court).
124 Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 764 (2011); see also
Eric W. Macaux, Limiting Representation in the Age of Private Law: Exploring the Ethics of Limited-Forum
Retainer Agreements, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 806–07 (2006) (asserting that “the plaintiffs most likely
to be disadvantaged” by forced arbitration clauses “are those least able to protect their interests: low income
individuals who depend on legal aid societies and other public interest organizations that in turn depend on
statutory fees”).
125 See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 90 (2014) (asserting that “mandatory arbitration exacerbates” existing
inequalities in the workplace).
126 See, e.g., D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313–14 (D. Conn. 2011) (granting an
employer’s motion to compel individualized arbitration of FLSA overtime claims brought on behalf of two
exotic dancers who worked in the defendants’ clubs); LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ.
2308(BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 124590, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (concluding that Concepcion precludes the
argument that there is a nonwaivable right to bring an FLSA collective action).
127 GUPTA & KHAN, supra note 75, at 3–4; id. at 8 (asserting that Time Warner and Comcast both employ
class action bans in their contracts with consumers, and that 63% of “Americans live in areas where they can
choose only between these two providers”).
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become standard in many industries,128 rendering low-wage employees largely
captive and with no realistic alternatives when confronted with such a clause,
since “it is likely that most other employers in his field require their employees
to sign similar agreements.”129
Other judicial assaults on collective action litigation take the form of
barriers to class certification. For example, whereas courts previously avoided
any “preliminary inquiry into the merits” at the class certification stage,130
recent years have seen the development of a standard under which plaintiffs
are required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence—just as they would
at trial—any fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23, even if it also
goes to the merits.131 In particular, the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend has demanded that lower courts perform a “rigorous
analysis” of class certification issues, even to the extent that they overlap with
the merits of the case.132 The Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes largely carried these heightened requirements over into the injunctive
realm, by redefining the hitherto easy-to-satisfy commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a)(2).133 And the development in recent years of an “implicit
requirement” of ascertainability, under which courts in consumer cases have
refused to certify classes in the absence of “reliable proof of purchase or a
knowable list of injured plaintiffs,” has sounded a death knell for many (if not
most) class actions arising from small retail purchases.134

128 Sternlight, supra note 80, at 1330 & n.135 (citing statistics). For example, the percentage of companies
using arbitration clauses to preclude employment class actions soared to 43% in 2014 from 16% in 2012.
Weber, supra note 119.
129 Iliza Bershad, Employing Arbitration: FLSA Collective Actions Post-Concepcion, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 359, 362 (2012).
130 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)).
131 See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the
“some showing” standard and adopting a requirement that plaintiffs provide “definitive” proof, through
“affidavits, documents, or testimony, to . . . [establish] that each Rule 23 requirement has been met”); In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 316, 320 (“An overlap between a class certification
requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to
determine whether a class certification requirement is met.”).
132 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013). The majority in Comcast found class certification inappropriate
where each plaintiff’s damages calculations predominated over common liability issues. Id. at 1433.
133 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011).
134 Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class
Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 310 (2010); see, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir.
2013).
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Finally, legislative actions have further depressed class action activity. As
discussed above, congressional prohibitions on class actions by LSC-funded
lawyers resulted in a significant drop in class cases representing low-income
and poor populations.135 More recently, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA), which allows for the removal of most significant state class filings to
federal court,136 has also undercut state-law consumer class actions. And in
2015, Congress held hearings on tightening CAFA’s requirements.137
One possible counteractive force lies with the CFPB, which has authority
under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to
regulate or prohibit forced arbitration clauses in consumer financial
contracts.138 In March 2015, the CFPB released a study concluding that forced
arbitration clauses have suppressed consumer claims and immunized financial
services companies from liability for broad-scale harms.139 In light of these
findings, the CFPB is now considering rules that would ban companies from
including class action bans in their consumer arbitration clauses. But even if
the embattled agency were to promulgate rules prohibiting class action bans,
its jurisdiction is limited to consumer finance;140 and, of course, contractual
class action bans are only one tool used in the broader dismantling of collective
litigation.
135

See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR
ONLY HALF A LAWYER, http://brennan.3cdn.net/3cbbeedd52806583b1_osm6blo8g.pdf (documenting
drop in class actions in the wake of 1996 restrictions). But see Henry Rose, Class Actions and the Poor,
6 PIERCE L. REV. 55, 63 (2007) (observing that prior to restrictions, “the number of class actions [in which
LSC-funded lawyers participated] was very small,” and citing statistics indicating that LSC-funded class
actions “had steadily declined from the late 1980s to 1995”).
136 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4, 12–13 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453 (2012)); see also Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1345 (observing that “Congress’[s] decision to shift
multi-state class actions into the federal courts pits large corporations against . . . plaintiffs who may be
relatively under-resourced,” reflecting contemporary “social values that implicate the accessibility of federal
courts for claimants with limited financial resources”).
137 State of Class Actions Ten Years After the Enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015).
138 12 U.S.C §§ 1414, 5518(b) (2012); 15 U.S.C § 1639c(e). Section 5518(b) states that the agency may
“prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between
the parties,” if it finds such a prohibition “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.” Id.
§ 5518(b).
139 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 116.
140 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 95, at 656 & n.150, 658 (observing two jurisdictional limits on
CFPB authority: first, that Dodd–Frank mandates that any regulation limiting or prohibiting the use of
arbitration provisions must be forward-looking rather than retroactive, and applicable only to agreements
entered 180 days after the regulation’s effective date; and second, that the agency has authority only over
enumerated statutes that involve consumer financial arrangements).
WITH
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE
This Essay’s first claim is that low-income groups are more susceptible to
abusive practices in the marketplace and the workplace—practices that violate
statutory rights and give rise to class actions and collective litigation. The
second claim is that, because few members of low-income groups are able to
achieve any earnings mobility, the poor generally stay poor. As such, members
of this cohort are more likely to experience chronic instances of group-based
wrongdoing, repeated over the course of their lives and possibly the lives of
their children. Accordingly, in this era of high income inequality and low
mobility, the deterrence function of class litigation takes on a critical role to
prevent ongoing abuses directed towards an entire class of persons. And yet, in
this same era, we are witnessing a judicial and legislative dismantling of the
class action device in precisely the areas of greatest direct consequence to
low-income groups.141
This final Part will reflect upon the consequences of these gloomy
socioeconomic and doctrinal developments for the law writ large and the
judges who superintend it.
A. The End of Poverty Law?
As low-income plaintiffs find themselves blocked from bringing class
actions, whole categories of legal claims will quickly disappear from the
docket—claims sounding in, for example, abusive debt collection, predatory
lending, illegal foreclosures, and unfair or unpaid wages. These are among the
legal issues that economically vulnerable populations are most likely to
encounter; these are also the sorts of claims most efficiently brought as class
actions, and therefore are most vulnerable to recent judicial and legislative
restrictions on collective litigation. The impending disappearance of these
cases from the civil docket has consequences beyond the denial of access to
justice for the effected communities, as the legal regime is also bound to lose
the information forcing and common law development generated by such
litigation.142
141 COFFEE, supra note 17, at 53 (observing that class actions have historically “empowered persons who
otherwise lacked access to courts,” and given “a legal voice to the unrepresented”); see also Myriam Gilles,
The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 101 (forthcoming)
(arguing that the decline in class actions coupled with the turn towards private arbitration may mean that, for
many areas of law, common law doctrinal development will cease).
142 See, e.g., Alexandra Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3193, 3199 (2013) (“[L]itigation forces information into the public eye. . . . [and is] a particularly powerful
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For example, in prior work focused on the effects of class action bans on
developing legal doctrine, I engaged in the following thought experiment:
Assume that every company that might reasonably be interested in avoiding
class action exposure were to write arbitration clauses and class bans into all of
its standard-form contracts. Given the private and non-precedential nature of
arbitration, what implications does this hold for the development of the law?
To answer this question, I took a typical state consumer protection statute—I
chose the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA)143—and examined cases arising
under that statute in both the Seventh Circuit and the Illinois Supreme Court
from 2005 to 2014 to determine how many of these would be subject to class
action bans under current law—and, by definition, no longer classable.144 In
the Seventh Circuit, my search yielded thirty-five ICFA cases, eighteen of
which were class actions brought against, among others, mortgage banks,145
savings & loans associations,146 debt collectors,147 insurance companies,148 tax
preparers,149 rental companies,150 credit reporting services,151 long-distance
service providers,152 and telecom companies.153 A search of the Illinois

means of information forcing, and even the threat of civil discovery can result in disclosure. By enabling
litigation that cannot be brought individually, group litigation serves a critical role in a society that depends on
litigation to unearth information. . . . [because] aggregate litigation empowers plaintiffs who otherwise would
not be able to bring suit individually. Furthermore, the high profile nature of some class actions and other
aggregate litigation also means that the information is publicized more readily than in individual litigation,
which might receive less attention.”).
143 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1-12 (West 2016).
144 Gilles, supra note 141, at 146–49.
145 See Cohen v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2013) (class action by mortgage-holders
against bank).
146 Courtney v. Halleran, 485 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2007) (class action by depositors against directors of
failed savings and loan association).
147 Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2014) (class suit against debt collectors).
148 Howland v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2012) (class action by insureds against title
insurer alleging kickbacks); Greenberger v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2011) (class action
by insureds against insurer).
149 Marshall v. H&R Block Tax Servs. Inc., 564 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2009) (class action by consumers of
tax preparers for false advertising).
150 The Home Depot, Inc. v. Rickher, No. 06-8006, 2006 WL 1727749 (7th Cir. May 22, 2006) (consumer
class action for sale of damage waivers in tool rental agreement).
151 Clark v. Experian Info. Servs., 256 Fed. App’x 818 (7th Cir. 2007) (class action by consumers against
credit reporting agency).
152 Dreamscape Design, Inc. v. Affinity Network, Inc., 414 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2005) (class action against
long-distance service provider for undisclosed fees).
153 Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663 (7th Cir.
2008) (class action by consumers of telecommunications bundling service).
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Supreme Court ICFA decisions produced similar results.154
In my ICFA sample, plaintiff class members alleged violations of state and
federal consumer protection statutes in the form of undisclosed fees, unfair and
deceptive practices, false advertising, and fraud. And the decisions themselves
include a controversial pronouncement by the Seventh Circuit that federal
banking laws will not generally “preempt state laws of general applicability
like the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act”;155 a test for resolving “a conflict
between a state rule of procedure and a federal rule of procedure” where facts
pled under the ICFA do not meet the pleading standards under the federal
rules;156 and numerous, substantive Illinois Supreme Court rulings interpreting
the ICFA.157 This was consumer law in action, advancing forward in the great
tradition of the common law.
Of course, this sample provided just a tiny illustration of the range of
doctrinal developments that would be foreclosed if class action bans are
universally adopted; and these findings are only heightened once the full range
of obstacles to class litigation are taken into account. Further, the class actions
in the ICFA sample were not brought specifically on behalf of low-income
groups, as the legal violations asserted span the social and economic spectrum.
But, again, low-income groups are more likely to fall victim to the types of
abusive practices alleged and, as such, suffer disproportionately where legal
claims seeking to address these injuries are blocked.
Moving beyond consumer claims, the unavailability of collective litigation
for other areas that constitute the civil side of “poverty law”—housing,
wage-and-hour, and employment discrimination—portends similar doctrinal
consequences. Legal precedents in these disparate areas are constantly
evolving in response to developments in the workplace, changing
demographics, technology, and new theories of liability.158 But once claims
disappear from the public justice system—save only for the stray public
enforcement or non-profit legal services cases—common law development in
154 I found thirty-five ICFA cases decided by the Illinois Supreme Court since 2005, fourteen of which
were garden-variety class actions brought by consumers of insurance products, mortgage services,
telecommunications, utilities, and ordinary products. Gilles, supra note 144, at 146–47.
155 Courtney v. Halleran, 485 F.3d 942, 951 (7th Cir. 2007).
156 Windy City Metal, 536 F.3d at 671 (comparing FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring only notice pleading) with
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–601 (requiring that pleadings contain substantial allegations of fact)).
157 Gilles, supra note 144, at 146–49 (reviewing ICFA cases decided by the Illinois Supreme Court).
158 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1550 (2005). “The body
of employment law is therefore found in hundreds of separate statutes and thousands of court decisions,” and
has “evolved through social practice, judicial doctrine, and statutory enactment.” Id.
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these critical areas will simply cease, leaving judges a greatly impoverished
body of decisional law to draw upon. The next section considers these and
related consequences for the judiciary.
B. Judicial Blind Spots
When judges are no longer confronted regularly with the civil claims of the
poor, a legitimate concern is that they will become unversed in and
desensitized to the underlying factual issues that affect lower-income
groups.159 This inexperience, in turn, may compound an existing and
unconscious predisposition against lower-income claimants.160 Over time, one
would expect this cognitive, cultural and political distance between jurists and
economically vulnerable groups to grow and solidify, so that—eventually—
judicial decisions exhibiting elements of classism may become altogether
uncontroversial.161
Some forms of this claim have previously been made by scholars
examining the effects of judicial blind spots in other areas of law.162 For
example, both Janet Cooper Alexander and Rhonda Wasserman have
suggested that, in the class action context where nearly all cases settle before a
merits-based determination, judges often lack the substantive knowledge of the
underlying facts as produced through adversarial litigation.163 Over time, as
more and more class actions are litigated only to the point of a class
certification motion, there is less and less law on the underlying merits upon
159 Further, if judicial experience with economically fragile communities becomes limited to criminal
trials and sentencing, one might expect judges to grow ever more suspicious of and hostile towards civil claims
brought by members of these groups. As it stands currently, “many members of society view poor people as
responsible for their socioeconomic status,” a long-held perspective that some judges may already share.
Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 147 (2013)
(observing that “[t]his viewpoint has historical roots in the early American conception of poor people as lazy
or immoral” and that “[t]he poor have traditionally been stereotyped as ‘welfare queens’ whose behavior
merits the ‘reasonable suspicion and disdain of broader society’”).
160 Mitchell. F. Crusto, Empathetic Dialogue: From Formalism to Value Principles, 65 SMU L. REV. 845,
858 (2012) (describing the claim of “unconscious judicial classicism” that “judges unconsciously favor the
powerful over the powerless”).
161 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (2000) (describing the New Institutionalism claim that “routinized
sequences of behavior eventually come to define normalcy, or more broadly, reality”).
162 See Neitz, supra note 159, at 146 (observing that “scholars have extensively considered racial and
gender bias, but have placed little to no emphasis on socioeconomic bias in courtrooms”).
163 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions,
43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 566 (1991); Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG. 889,
919–20 (2012).
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which judges may reliably draw.164 The dearth of doctrine may then disable
judges from accurately adjudging whether a proposed settlement is really fair
to all affected parties.165 Professor Alex Reinert has similarly observed that
“federal judges have extremely limited judicial experience to apply to
merits-based decisions” at the pleading stage, as required by Supreme Court
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.166 These “gaps in judicial experience,” he
asserts, can result in an “impoverished landscape of actual merits-based
determinations.”167 And that is deeply problematic because
when we move away from public adjudication, we lose something
important: information about how our justice system works to resolve
disputes. This information, and the process by which it is divulged, is
important not only for its own sake but also for reinforcing a
democratic norm of equal accountability. What is sometimes
overlooked, however, is that the information is important to ensuring
legitimate and reliable future adjudication.168

Taken together, these scholars’ commonsensical assertion is that deficiencies
in judicial knowledge can have deleterious effects on the fair and just
adjudication of claims.
My assertion is that judicial inexperience with the legal claims typically
brought by low-income groups has far more disquieting consequences because,
as contemporary judges see fewer civil cases brought by or on behalf of poor
people, they may grow further out of touch with and become ill-equipped to
manage these claims. Eventually, the inability to relate to these claimants and
the systemic problems that face them will reveal itself in decisions exuding a

164

Alexander, supra note 163, at 567.
Wasserman, supra note 163, at 920 (“If settlements are routinely filed under seal, courts will lack the
comparative data needed to gauge the fairness of settlements submitted for their approval.”).
166 Alexander Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767, 1769, 1772 (2014). Professor
Reinert observes,
165

The end result of all of these trends is a federal judiciary that has very little experience evaluating
the merits of claims. Trials have decreased and cases have been shunted away from federal court
by arbitration doctrine. Information that might assist in assessing plausibility, such as discovery
and settlement information, is increasingly inaccessible. And summary judgment adjudication
cannot make up for this lack of information and experience.
Id. at 1785.
167 Id. at 1769.
168 Id. at 1785 (footnotes omitted).
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lack of empathy or understanding concerning the lives of 90 million
Americans.169
C. Examining Judicial Indifference
A famous example of this phenomenon is United States v. Kras,170 where
an indigent debtor filed for relief under the bankruptcy laws, but was unable to
pay the $50 filing fee and was denied a hardship waiver.171 The debtor then
brought a constitutional challenge to the filing fee, relying on a series of
Supreme Court precedents invalidating such administrative fees in divorce and
other cases on due process, access-to-justice grounds.172 But in Kras a divided
Court upheld the bankruptcy filing fee as constitutional.173 In doing so, the
majority engaged in a series of revealing observations concerning the debtor’s
financial circumstances and its view that Kras ought to have been able to work
(or talk) his way out of bankruptcy.174
For example, Justice Blackmun’s majority notes that the challenged filing
fee—if it were paid in weekly installments of $1.92 over three months—
represented “less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a
pack or two of cigarettes,”175 implying that the debtor was making definitive

169 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 325, 330 (2010) (observing that judges play “a singular and defining role in creating,
maintaining, and assuring open, effective, and meaningful access to the system of justice they administer,” but
that decisions ignoring the plight of low-income individuals challenge the legitimacy of that role).
170 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
171 Id. at 437–38; see also Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness,
79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1500 n.2 (1991) (quoting from Kras’ affidavit: “Kras resides in a 2 1/2-room apartment
with his wife, two children, ages 5 years and 8 months, his mother, and his mother’s 6-year-old daughter. His
younger child suffers from cystic fibrosis and is undergoing treatment in a medical center. . . . Kras [is]
unemployed . . . . He has diligently sought steady employment . . . The Kras household subsists entirely on . . .
public assistance . . . . These benefits are all expended for rent and day-to-day necessities. . . . His sole assets
are wearing apparel and $50 worth of essential household goods . . . . He has a couch of negligible value in
storage on which a $6 payment is due monthly” (alterations in original)).
172 Kras, 409 U.S. at 444–45; see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971) (invaliding a
filing fee that “block[s] access to the judicial process” by the indigents as a violation of due process and equal
protection); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17–19 (1956) (invalidating a transcript-funding requirement to
perfect an appeal in a criminal case, observing that the imposition of such costs would render the right of
appeal a “meaningless [promise] to the poor” and would undermine our shared dedication “to affording equal
justice to all and special privileges to none”).
173 Kras, 409 U.S. at 446–47; id. at 450 (Burger, J., concurring); id. at 451 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 445 (majority opinion).
175 Id. at 449. As Thomas Ross has asserted, when Justice Blackmun “assumed that Mr. Kras had the
money for a weekly trip to the movies or cigarettes, he ignored the real differences in the circumstances of
those in poverty and those outside the boundaries of poverty.” Ross, supra note 171, at 1500 n.2.
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choices about how to spend his capital, rather than crediting the more realistic
view that Kras simply had no money at all—whether to buy cigarettes or pay a
bankruptcy filing fee.176 Wagging its finger, the majority next asserts that “if
[Kras] really needs and desires the [bankruptcy] discharge, this much available
revenue should be within his able-bodied reach.”177 Again, the scolding tone
suggests that Kras had resolved to opt out of full employment, rather than
recognizing—as detailed in petitioner’s briefs—that he had repeatedly sought
and failed to find regular work.178 And finally, the opinion patronizingly
questions the very decision to file for bankruptcy, pondering why Kras (if he
“really needs and desires the discharge”) didn’t simply seek to “adjust his
debts by negotiat[ing] with his creditors” so as to avoid involving the courts in
the first place.179 Kras, who had little schooling and no funds to offer his
creditors in settlement, could hardly be in a worse position to engage in the
type of broad-shouldered deal making the Justices appear to have in mind.
Thoroughly out of touch with the petitioner and others like him, the Kras
majority decision is striking for its insistence that poverty is a choice; full
employment is readily available for those who seek it; and creditors are
interested in rational and collaborative cooperation with those in arrears.
A dissent by Justice Stewart pointed out that Kras’s income, such as it was,
“barely suffices to meet the costs of the daily essentials of life and includes no
allotment that could be budgeted for the expense to gain access to the
courts.”180 With no assets and “not even a sufficient prospect of income to be
able to promise the payment of a $50,” the bankruptcy offered Kras his only
chance “to get out from under a lifetime burden of debt”; without it, Justice
Stewart maintained, “Kras will remain in the totally hopeless situation he now
finds himself.”181 The majority, he concluded, denied justice “to those who

176 Kras, 409 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for [the poor],
not a routine purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The desperately poor almost never go to see a
movie, which the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They have more important things to
do with what little money they have—like attempting to provide some comforts for a gravely ill child, as Kras
must do.”).
177 Id. at 449 (majority opinion).
178 Id. at 437, 449; id. at 451 (Stewart, J. dissenting); see also Nicholas Kristof, ‘Inequality Is a Choice,’
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2015, at SR11 (“I overheard one billionaire—who had gotten his start in life by inheriting
a fortune—discuss with another the problem of lazy Americans who were trying to free ride on the rest . . . .”).
179 Kras, 409 U.S. at 445, 449 (majority opinion).
180 Id. at 454 (Stewart, J. dissenting) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372–73 (1971)).
181 Id. at 455–56.
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need it most, to those who every day must live face-to-face with abject
poverty—who cannot spare even $1.28 a week.”182
Justice Marshall dissented separately to chide the Kras majority’s
insensitive and inaccurate understanding of the lives of the poor: “It may be
easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less than $2 are no
burden. But no one who has had close contact with poor people can fail to
understand how close to the margin of survival many of them are.”183 For
Marshall, the majority’s “disgraceful” and “unfounded assumptions about how
people live” were deeply consequential—he cited the 1970 census finding that
800,000 families lived on less than $20 per week—and went far beyond the
specifics of this case.184 Rather, for Marshall, Kras involved the fundamental
right of access to the courts, the opportunity for every person claiming a legal
violation to be given a fair hearing. As such, the majority decision revealed, for
Justice Marshall, the near-impossibility of securing that right for low-income
litigants where judges were unwilling or unable to comprehend the systemic
socioeconomic problems that regularly confront this group.
Kras was followed by numerous Supreme Court decisions exhibiting a cool
detachment from the plight of the poor. In Ortwein v. Schwab, for example, the
majority upheld a $25 filing fee assessed to welfare applicants.185 In dissent,
Justice Douglas angrily accused the majority of perpetuating a justice system
that had become “the private preserve for the affluent.”186 As Gene Nichols has
powerfully argued, decisions such as Kras and Ortwein reveal the Court’s
willingness to retreat from “the core commitment” of meaningful access to
justice in cases involving the poor.187 The Court, and perhaps the rest of us as
well, Nichols warns, “have become solidly comfortable with a scheme of civil

182

Id. at 457. William O. Douglas, another of the four dissenters, wrote about the case some months later
in his memoir, observing, “Never did I dream that I would live to see the day when a court held that a person
could be too poor to get the benefits of bankruptcy.” WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE
EARLY YEARS 175 (1974).
183 Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 459–60.
185 410 U.S. 656, 656, 661 (1973) (per curiam).
186 Id. at 661 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Meltzer v. C. Buck Le Craw & Co, 402 U.S. 954, 961
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Justice Marshall also dissented on the grounds that “important benefits [have
been] taken without affording them a chance to contest the legality of the taking in a court of law.” Id. at 666
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27, 31–32 (1981)
(rejecting an indigent’s request for appointed counsel in a case brought by the state to terminate parental
rights).
187 Nichol, supra note 169, at 345 (quoting Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1981)).
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justice that leaves millions out.”188 And, comfort with this exclusion can easily
develop into a stony disinterest in the underlying, systemic problems that face
low-income groups.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Pineda-Morena reveals the persistence of judicial indifference to the issues
facing low-income litigants.189 There, the court upheld as permissible under the
Fourth Amendment the DEA’s placement of a GPS-tracking device on the
defendant’s car while it was parked outside his rented trailer home.190 Despite
the government’s concession that the defendant’s car was “parked within the
curtilage of his home when agents attached the tracking device,” the court
instead determined the car was “parked in his driveway, which is ‘only a
semi-private area,’” and accorded little Fourth Amendment protection.191
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski rebuked his colleagues for failing to recognize the elitist nature of
their vision of Fourth Amendment protection:
The very rich will still be able to protect their privacy with the aid of
electric gates, tall fences, security booths, remote cameras, motion
sensors and roving patrols, but the vast majority of the 60 million
people living in the Ninth Circuit will see their privacy materially
diminished by the panel’s ruling.192

For Chief Judge Kozinsky, the panel’s finding that a low-income, Mexican
American living in a rented trailer in a poor neighborhood had no right to
privacy in his driveway reeked of cultural elitism and revealed the great gulf
between federal judges and many of the litigants who come before them:
There’s been much talk about diversity on the bench, but there’s one
kind of diversity that doesn’t exist: No truly poor people are
appointed as federal judges, or as state judges for that matter. Judges,
regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the class of
people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos. The everyday
problems of people who live in poverty are not close to our hearts
and minds because that’s not how we and our friends live. . . . When
you glide your BMW into your underground garage or behind an
electric gate, you don’t need to worry that somebody might attach a
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 349.
591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1213, 1216–17.
Id. at 1215 (citing United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975)).
United States v. Pineda-Morena, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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tracking device to it while you sleep. But the Constitution doesn’t
prefer the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his
trailer is entitled to the same privacy and peace of mind as the man
whose urban fortress is guarded by the Bel Air Patrol.”193

Chief Judge Kozinski’s critique of his colleagues is grounded in the
inability of many judges to empathize with poor people because they have
never been poor and have had no first-hand exposure to poor people. Indeed,
the only reliable means by which judges are regularly exposed to those who are
different—the poor, minorities, immigrants—is through the cases that appear
by random assignment on their dockets. But if I am right that many of these
claims are now vanishing from the docket, one would expect the cognitive,
cultural and political distance between jurists and economically vulnerable
groups to grow and solidify. And eventually, judicial decisions exhibiting
elements of classism, decisions like Kras and Pineda-Morena, will no longer
seem so controversial—indeed, they may even issue without strong dissents.
And, at some point, the only cases in which judges will glimpse the lives of
individuals living on the economic edge are criminal cases like
Pineda-Morena.
CONCLUSION
The insights of this Essay borrow from many recent articles and books
exploring the effects of various public- and private-sector policies on
particularly vulnerable groups. For example, civil rights scholars have studied
the millions of black men missing from their communities due to high
incarceration and mortality rates, which is the result of systemic
socioeconomic issues.194 Economists have examined fiscal policies resulting in
working-class and immigrant populations shut out from the ranks of
entrepreneurs and job creators.195 And feminists have long inveighed against
193

Id. at 1123 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (discussing the striking number of incarceration of African Americans in the United
States and the violation of their human rights); Wolfers et al., supra note 16 (“African-American men have
long been more likely to be locked up and more likely to die young, but the scale of the combined toll is
nonetheless jarring. It is a measure of the deep disparities that continue to afflict black men—disparities being
debated after a recent spate of killings by the police—and the gender gap is itself a further cause of social ills,
leaving many communities without enough men to be fathers and husbands.”).
195 P. Köllinger & M. Minniti, Not for Lack of Trying: American Entrepreneurship in Black and White,
27 SMALL BUS. ECON. 59 (2006) (reporting that minorities have a high propensity to attempt to start a
business, but they are less likely to succeed due to numerous policy-based obstacles); Lloyd Blanchard, Bo
Zhao & John Yinger, Do Lenders Discriminate Against Minority and Woman Entrepreneurs?, 63 J. URB.
194
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employment practices which exclude women from high-profile workplaces—
recently, Silicon Valley’s tech industry and Wall Street’s financial corridor.196
These literatures share an obvious central premise: when entire groups vanish
from public view, so too do their contributions, voices, and perspectives—all
at potentially high cost to both the affected groups and society more broadly.
Implicit, too, in these literatures is the recognition that public policies have
ineluctably helped to produce or perpetuate discrepancies in access, and that
only a reversal of those policies can begin to close these gaps.
The focus here is similarly on developments that have rendered low-income
populations incapable of collectively accessing the civil justice system to
resolve group-based harms. For low-income groups, aggregating claims has
traditionally provided an important means of accessing justice. In an era of
increasing poverty and a growing gap between rich and poor, these issues
concerning access take on critical significance.197

ECON. 467 (2008) (reporting that Black, Hispanic and low-income loan applicants experience less favorable
outcomes than do white and middle-class applicants).
196 For example, in March 2015, Ellen Pao brought a gender-discrimination claim against Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers, testifying about a clubby, all-male atmosphere that failed to respect women. While a jury
found against Pao, other female employees have now filed gender-discrimination claims against Facebook and
Twitter. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, A Woman Disrupts How Silicon Valley Does Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2015, at B1.
197 Paul A. Jargowsky, Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the Concentration of Poverty and
Public Policy, http://apps.tcf.org/architecture-of-segregation. The number of people living in high-poverty
areas nearly doubled between 2000 and 2013, to 13.8 million since 2000, and the number of people living in
neighborhoods where the poverty rate is 40% or more has grown by 76%. Id.

